Untwisting New Jersey's Cap on Punitive Damages

1.

INTRODUCTION

Courts in the United States have awarded punitive damages
for more than two centuries.'
They have traditionally been
awarded to punish and deter powerful defendants who have acted
willfully or with reckless disregard for the health and safety of
others.2 Over the years, the reasons for awarding these damages
have expanded to include compensating plaintiffs for emotional
distress, providing incentives for plaintiffs to sue, and forcing corporations to consider the effects of their decisions on the safety of
the public.' Opponents of punitive damage awards claim that
these additional reasons have led to an increase in the size and
frequency of these awards.4 Reliable studies, however, do not support these allegations.5
Rather, these studies suggest that big business and insurance
companies, whose profits are directly affected by punitive damage
awards, have launched substantial attacks against the continued
use of the doctrine in the form of widespread public relations campaigns.' The influence of these strong lobby groups has spurned
constitutional scrutiny by the United States Supreme Court and
pressured legislatures nationwide to enact tort reform legislation.7
Most notably for practitioners in New Jersey, on June 29, 1995, the
legislature enacted a punitive damage cap severely restricting the
discretion of juries to award punitive damages.8 In addition, the
United States Supreme Court decided in May 1996 that a punitive
damage award of $2 million against BMW was unconstitutionally
I See Genay v. Norris, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 6 (1784).
2 For a discussion of the original purposes for awarding punitive damages see
infra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
3 See Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The HistoricalContinuity of PunitiveDamage
Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1269, 1317, 1322 (1993) (explaining that punitive damages encourage plaintiffs to sue and keep corporate defendants from abusing their power over consumers).
4 For a discussion of the alleged explosion in punitive damage awards see infra
note 42 and accompanying text.
5 For a discussion of the current trend in punitive damage awards see infra note
40 and accompanying text.
6 See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
7 For a discussion of tort reform legislation enacted nationwide, see infra notes
58-61 and accompanying text.
8 See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:15-5.9 to -5.17 (West Supp. 1996).
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excessive. 9
Part I of this Comment reviews the history of and recent
trends in punitive damage awards while discussing arguments for
and against the continued use of the common law doctrine. Part II
addresses the enactment of the New Jersey statute and the recent
United States Supreme Court decision in BMW of North America,
Inc. v. Gore. Part III, the conclusion, discusses the importance of
the BMW decision, why a cap on punitive damages is not an effective answer, and proffers solutions to the alleged runaway punitive
damage problem.
II.
A.

THE HISTORY AND CURRENT

TREND OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES

The History of Punitive Damages

Punitive or exemplary damages1" originally developed in the
English Legal System as an "auxiliary" to the criminal law system. 1
Punitive damages were awarded to address antisocial conduct left
unpunished by the criminal system;' 2 the doctrine
was not in13
damages.
actual
for
victims
compensate
to
tended
9 See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1604 (1996).
10 See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 390 (6th ed. 1990).

Exemplary damages are damages on an increased scale, awarded to the
plaintiff over and above what will barely compensate him for his property loss, where the wrong done to him was aggravated by circumstances
of violence, oppression, malice, fraud, or wanton and wicked conduct
on the part of the defendant, and are intended to solace the plaintiff for
mental anguish, laceration of his feelings, shame, degradation, or other
aggravations of the original wrong, or else to punish the defendant for
his evil behavior or to make an example of him, for which reason they
are also called 'punitive' or 'punitory' damages or vindictive damages.
Id.
11 See James B. Sales & Kenneth B. Cole, Jr., Punitive Damages: A Relic That Has
Outlived Its Origins, 37 VAND. L. Rv. 1117, 1123 (1984). One of the justifications
English courts often cited for the award of punitive damages was punishment of egregious tort behavior by imposing a criminal fine on defendants. See id. Justifying allegedly excessive jury awards and compensating plaintiffs for intangible injuries such as
emotional distress are two other theories that English courts used to justify the award
of punitive damages. See id. at 1120, 1121.
12 See Samuel Freifield, The Rationale of Punitive Damages, 1 OHIo ST. L.J. 5, 7
(1935). In addition to the public policy of punishing defendants, deterring future
misconduct, and augmenting punishment for offenses against the person, punitive
damages were awarded to cover gaps in the criminal law system. See id. at 6, 7.
Freifield supported the award of punitive damages where the underlying offense
amounted to a violation of a personal right as opposed to a property right. See id. at 9.
13 SeeVictor E. Schwartz & Mark A. Behrens, PunitiveDamages Reform-State Legislatures Can and Should Meet the Challenge Issued by the Supreme Court of the United States in
Haslip, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1365, 1368 (1993). Punitive damages exist to punish the
tortfeasor and deter future misconduct, while compensatory damages serve the function of "making the plaintiff whole" for actual damages incurred. See id. Punitive
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Punitive damages have their origin in the United States in the
common law as well.'" Courts typically granted an award where the

defendant's actions amounted to a malicious act."5 The first reported case involving punitive damages in the United States was
Genay v. Norris, decided in 1784.16 In Genay, the Court awarded
"vindictive damages" against the defendant, a physician, who inten-

tionally spiked the plaintiff's 17drink as they prepared to settle a dispute by dueling with pistols.
Punitive damages were first awarded in NewJersey in 1791; in
Coryell v. Colbaugh,'8 the court affirmed a jury award of exemplary
damages where the defendant breached his promise to marry the
plaintiff. 19 At trial, the judge instructed the jury to award damages
for "example's sake" in an amount sufficient to prevent similar misconduct in the future.2 °
Punitive or exemplary damages became firmly entrenched in
the common law as a result of the United States Supreme Court
decision in Day v. Woodworth.2 1 The Day Court affirmed a jury
award for trespass and announced that the jury's discretion to
award punitive damages "[wa]s a well-established principle of the
22
common law."

damages were originally a "helper" to the criminal justice system which dealt with
infringements on property rights more severely than violations of personal rights. See
id. at 1369.
14 See Genay v. Norris, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 6, 6 (1784).
15 See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 3, at 1290-94 (reviewing early American cases
involving the award of punitive damages).
16 See Genay, 1 S.C.L. at 6; Rustad & Koenig, supra note 3, at 1290.
17 See Genay, 1 S.C.L. at 6. The dose of cantharides caused the plaintiff large
amounts of pain. See id. The Court held that the serious injury to the plaintiff entitled him to exemplary damages because the physician, by the nature of his profession,
knew his actions would result in excruciating pain to the plaintiff. See id. at 7.
18 1 N.J.L. 77 (Sup. Ct. 1791).
19 See id. at 77. The judge in his jury charge said that the defendant's conduct
destroyed the plaintiffs' prospect of a family. See id. The judge also told the jury that
"they were not to estimate the damages by any particular proof of suffering... ; but to
give damages for example's sake." M& The judge went on to address the amount of
damages by strongly stating that the jury was not bound to a certain amount but
should award a sum that would demonstrate their disapproval and be an "example to
others." See id. at 78.
20 See id. at 77.
21 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 364 (1851). In Day, the defendant entered the plaintiffs
land, which was located upstream of his employer's property. See id. The defendant
then reduced the height of a river dam to prevent further downstream injury to his
employer's mill. See id. The jury awarded damages after finding that although the
defendant's actions were malicious, a partial reduction of the dam was justified. See
id. at 365.
22 Id. at 371. To support the Court's finding that punitive damage awards are constitutional, the Court relied on precedent stating that "repeated judicial decisions for
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In these and other early decisions in the United States, courts
often awarded punitive damages when the defendant's conduct
amounted to willful and wanton disregard for the rights of others
or when the plaintiff was the victim of physical abuse. 25 The purpose for awarding these damages was to maintain peace and uphold societal, values by punishing "bullies" who tyrannized the
downtrodden. 24 The cases in which punitive damages were
awarded, however, were infrequent and primarily limited to intentional tort claims. 5
As the twentieth century approached and society became
more complex, courts began to focus the award of punitive damages on large corporations rather than on malicious and overpowering individuals. 26 Thus, punitive damages were a tool that society
used to control greedy corporations that had little regard for the
27
community's interests.
more than a century... are the best exposition of what the law is." Id. The Court also
noted that often the harm incurred by the plaintiff is not capable of monetary definition and the damages depend on circumstances such as "the degree of moral turpitude or atrocity of the defendant's conduct." Id.
23 See Chicago Consol. Traction Co. v. Mahoney, 82 N.E. 868, 869-70 (Ill. 1907)
($1250 punitive damage award to a female passenger against a conductor who used
unnecessary force in ejecting her); Hollins v. Gorham, 66 S.W. 823, 823 (Ky. 1902)
($450 punitive award to a 12-year-old boy who was assaulted by a man in a playground); Nyman v. Lynde, 101 N.W. 163, 163 (Minn. 1904) ($500 punitive damage
award to a child who was physically abused by the defendant); Campbell v. Crutcher,
224 S.W. 115, 116 (Mo. 1920) ($1000 punitive award against a defendant who assaulted a woman causing her extreme physical injury and a resultant nervous
breakdown).
24 See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 3, at 1292-94. Early courts used punitive awards
to punish defendants who exploited their power advantage over helpless plaintiffs.
See id. at 1292-93. Assault, battery, rape, and other forms of sexual assault were frequently targeted by judges as appropriate circumstances for punitive damage awards.
See id. at 1293.
25 See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at
10-11 (5th ed. 1984). Courts have historically considered the following torts as warranting punitive damage awards: "assault and battery, libel and slander, deceit, seduction, alienation of affections, malicious prosecutions, and intentional interferences
with property such as trespass, private nuisance, and conversion." Id. (footnotes
omitted).
26 See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 3, at 1294-95. Corporations were initially subjected to punitive damage awards pursuant to society's interest in punishing unethical
business practices that demonstrated little or no regard for the welfare of the nation's
people. See id. at 1295.
27 See id. at 1296-97. The railroads, in particular, were subject to numerous punitive damage awards for their willful disregard of their passengers' safety. See id.; Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Osborne, 30 S.W. 21, 21 (Ky. 1895) ($1000 punitive damage
award against a conductor who forcibly removed a passenger from a moving train);
Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Martino, 18 S.W. 1066, 1067 (Tex. 1892) ($2020 punitive
damage award against conductor who struck and threatened a female passenger).
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The early twentieth century also saw the rise of punitive damage awards to consumer plaintiffs.2" Courts awarded punitive damages in these consumer rights actions to protect against business
practices that took advantage of the inequality of bargaining power
between consumers and merchants. 9 As the doctrine continued
to develop,0 scholars began to debate the role of punitive damages
3
in society.
Today, scholars debate whether punitive damages continue to
serve their punishment and deterrent effect or whether the purpose for awarding punitive damages has grown and led to an explosion of damage awards.3 1 Critics attack the doctrine for awarding
windfalls to plaintiffs in the form of "criminal fines" without providing defendants the usual protections inherent in the criminal justice system.3 2 Opponents of punitive damages point to unlimited
28 See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 3, at 1303. Courts used punitive damages to
promote consumer protection in the early twentieth century. See id. In these consumer protection cases, the defendants' actions contained elements of "malice, fraud,
insult, or wanton and reckless disregard of the rights of the plaintiff." Id. (footnote
omitted).
29 See id. at 1304, 1303-04 nn.164-77. Consumer protection plaintiffs in fraudulent
commercial transaction cases were often awarded punitive damages. See id. at 1303.
For example, punitive damages were awarded where defendants sold worthless oil
properties and defective buildings and where a defendant misrepresented the condition of an automobile. See id. at 1304.

See, e.g., id. at 1298-301 (comparing 1 THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE
OF DAMAGES § 355 (9th ed. 1912) with 2 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON
LAW OF EVIDENCE 8253 (16th ed. 1899)). Professor Greenleaf believed that puni-

30

MEASURE
THE

tive damages were not a "part of the Anglo-American tradition" and had no "doctrinal
basis." Id. at 1299. Professor Greenleaf thought that the only reason to award damages at all was to compensate plaintiffs. See id. As such, Professor Greenleaf stressed
that damages should approximate the actual injury that was incurred by the plaintiff.
See id. at 1300. Sedgwick, on the other hand, strongly believed in "exemplary damages" as an effective means to set an example for society. See id. (quoting 1 SEDGWICK,
§ 365, at 718-19). According to Sedgwick, punitive damages should be awarded where
"oppression, brutality and insult" were involved in the defendant's misconduct. Id.
For a further discussion of the Greenleaf-Sedgwick debate see David G. Owen, A Punitive Damages Overview: Functions, Problems & Reform, 39 VILE. L. REV. 363, 370 n.34
(1994).
31 See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 3, at 1318-28. Punitive awards also serve additional purposes, such as providing compensation for non-physical injuries, encouraging private citizens to act as attorney generals by prosecuting misconduct that would
otherwise go undetected, and filling the gaps between the civil and criminal justice
systems. See id. at 1321, 1322, 1326.
32

See KEETON

ET AL.,

supra note 25, at 11. Critics claim that a punitive award acts as

a criminal fine without the usual safeguards inherent in the criminal justice system
such as: "guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the privilege against self-incrimination,
and even the rule against double jeopardy." Id. In a criminal case the burden of
proof required is beyond a reasonable doubt; in the context of a civil case, however,
the burden of proof is only a preponderance of the evidence. See Stephen Daniels &
Joanne Martin, Myth and Reality in Punitive Damages, 75 MINN. L. REv. 1, 7-8 (1990).
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jury discretion as the source of the problem.3 3
On the other hand, supporters of the continued use of punitive damages note that most jurisdictions have adopted procedural
protections and continue to stress that punitive damage awards are
an effective means for discouraging antisocial behavior.3 4 For example, A.H. Robins Pharmaceuticals Corporation recalled the
Dalkon Shield intrauterine device after eight punitive damage verdicts were awarded. 3 5 Proponents also argue that punitive damages
create an incentive for plaintiffs to bring quasi-criminal actions that
would ordinarily go unprosecuted.3 6
The difference between the burden of proof standards decreases the safeguards normally afforded to defendants who are subjected to criminal fines. See id. at 8. While
punitive damage awards encourage private attorneys general to bring suits that would
otherwise go unprosecuted, these private actions, unlike criminal prosecutions, sometimes subject defendants to multiple punishment for a single act and thus do not
afford the defendant protections against double jeopardy and excessive fines. See
Owen, supra note 30, at 383.
33 See International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 50 (1979) ('juries
are accorded broad discretion both as to the imposition and amount of punitive damages, the impact of these windfall recoveries is unpredictable and potentially substantial") (citations omitted).
34 See Daniels & Martin, supra note 32, at 9. Among the procedural protections
that govern the award of punitive damages are a heightened burden of proof, clear
and convincing evidence, and trial and appellate court review of awards. See id. Some
courts also require compensatory damages to be recovered prior to an award of punitive damages. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 25, at 14.
35 See Alan Cooper, Judges Cut Fee Awards in IUD Case, NAT'L L.J., May 15, 1995, at
A6. Between 1971 and 1974, A.H. Robins Co., a pharmaceutical company headquartered in Richmond, Virginia, made four million Dalkon Shield intrauterine devices.
See id.
A jury awarded punitive damages of $7.5 million to a 27-year old woman who
needed a hysterectomy after wearing an intrauterine device for several years. See Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co., 738 P.2d 1210, 1215 (Kan. 1987). The compensatory damages awarded were $1.7 million. See id. at 1237. The Supreme Court of Kansas
rejected Robins' claim that the award was excessive because there was substantial evidence in the record that Robins knew that the Dalkon Shield was not a safe product
and that the corporation engaged in a pattern of deception to convince doctors of the
product's safety and effectiveness. See id. at 1240. The Dalkon Shield caused a high
incidence of pelvic inflammatory diseases and spontaneous abortion. See id. In July of
1979, a jury awarded $6.2 million in punitive damages against Robins in a similar
Dalkon Shield litigation. See id. at 1246. However, instead of recalling the product
and recognizing the safety concerns, Robins issued a statement claiming that the
product was safe and effective and that the award was an "aberration." See id. In
upholding the award, the court noted that Ms. Tetuan's injuries may have been
avoided if Robins recalled the product after the litigation in 1979 because Ms. Tetuan
first experienced her current symptoms in September of 1979. See id.
36 See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 3, at 1322-26. Proponents note that private
attorneys general play an important role in society. See id. at 1324. In particular,
absent the punitive damage incentive, corporate misconduct that caused widespread
harm would go unprosecuted if it harmed each victim in a relatively small manner.
See id. at 1323-24; see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 25, at 12 (arguing that punitive

1996]
B.

COMMENT

173

The Current Trend in Punitive Damage Awards

The size of the largest punitive damage awards in the early
twentieth century does not compare to today's largest awards.
In
1930, punitive damage awards of $50,000, $33,000, and $12,500
were "startling."38 As of 1955, $75,000 was the largest punitive
damage award in California history and one of the two largest in
the United States.3 9
The apparent disparity between the largest punitive damage
awards of today and those of the past century has caused scholars
to debate the overall trend in the size and frequency of punitive
damage awards.4o Some studies conclude that any alleged increase
in size and frequency of punitive awards can be explained by inflation, stories of large punitive verdicts in seemingly outrageous situations, and the lack of statistical evidence to support the claims.4 '
Other legal authorities, however, present evidence that these
damages provide an incentive to bring private actions against "petty cases of outrage
and oppression" because they also cover the plaintiffs expenses incurred in litigating
the matter).
37 Compare RICHARD L. BLATr ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: A STATE BY STATE GUIDE
TO LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.2, at 5-6 (1991) (noting that the largest punitive damage
award assessed in the United States in the 19th century was $4500) with BMW of N.
Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1594 (1996) (trial court awarded $4 million in
punitive damages) and Tetuan, 738 P.2d at 1215) (jury awarded $7.5 million in punitive damages).
38 See BLATT ET AL., supra note 37, at 6 (noting that the present value of a $50,000
award in 1930 would be $332,000).
39 See id.
40 Compare Daniels & Martin, supra note 32, at 9-19 (discussing the politicization of
the debate over the current trend in punitive damages and concluding that public
relations and lobbying efforts on behalf of big business have used large awards as the
catalyst for their tort reform efforts) and Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything
About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System-And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. Ruv. 1147,
1164-66 (1992) (citing the lack of statistical evidence as the reason for the continued
debate over the trend in punitive damages) with Sales & Cole, supra note 11, at 1154
(arguing that unlimited jury discretion has led to an explosion of punitive damage
awards).
41 See Daniels & Martin, supra note 32, at 15. Opponents of the punitive damage
doctrine have assembled a "press kit" that is intended to distort the current trend in
the award of punitive damages. See id. In particular, the authors accused special interest groups of telling "horror stories" about large punitive awards that have detrimentally affected industries in the United States. See id. at 16. The goal of these
public relations campaigns is to create a picture that punitive damages are awarded
haphazardly in larger and larger amounts and are threatening the stability of the
economy. See id. at 17. Saks suggests that we lack the necessary information to make
intelligent statements about the current trend in punitive damage awards. See Saks,
supra note 40, at 1154-56. Saks states that many reports and findings are based mainly
on anecdotes of plaintiffs who have recovered huge awards. See id. at 1159. Saks alleges that the reason for the lack of data is the court system's failure until recently to
log data regarding size and frequency of punitive awards. See id. at 1155.
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awards have in fact exploded.42
The size of punitive damage awards has certainly reached new
levels in outstanding cases.4" As an American Bar Report found,
however, the alleged explosion in the size and frequency of punitive damages is overstated.'
Despite claims that there is a trend
towards huge, windfall damage awards, the extraordinary punitive
damage awards in the millions of dollars are the reason for the
substantial attention and criticism that the punitive damage doctrine has received in recent years.4 5
Several well-publicized cases included large punitive damage
awards. For example, ajury awarded $2.7 million to a New Mexico
42 See generally MARK PETERSON ET AL., PUNrrIVE DAMAGES, EMPIRICAL FINDINGS (The
Institute for Civil Justice 1987). This report (the RAND report) stated that the incidence of punitive damage awards and the amount of money awarded for punitive
purposes has increased substantially over the years. See id. at 65. The report also
noted that corporations were most likely to be the target of the awards. See id. at 47,
50. According to the report, contract cases were more likely to result in the award of
punitive damages than were personal injury cases. See id. at 65. The RAND report
concluded, however, that punitive damages continued to be rarely assessed in personal injury cases, and were most frequently assessed against defendants who were
found to have intentionally harmed plaintiffs. See id. According to the report, in most
of the cases, the punitive damage awards were modest. See id.; see also Sales & Cole,
supra note 11, at 1154 n.167 (reviewing extraordinary million dollar punitive damage
verdicts). Justice O'Connor, concurring and dissenting in part in Browning-FerrisIndus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989), argued against excessive
punitive awards. 492 U.S. at 282 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Referring to several large punitive awards against Ford Motor and a large punitive award against A.H. Robins, Justice O'Connor claimed that the amounts awarded
in punitive damage claims had 'skyrocketed' more than 30 times in the last 10 years.
See id.
43 For examples of two extraordinary verdicts, see BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore,
116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996) and Tetuan v. A. H. Robins Co., 738 P.2d 1210 (Kan. 1987).
44 See Daniels & Martin, supra note 32, at 28-43. An American Bar Foundation
report of 47 counties in 11 states from 1981-1985 and two counties from 1970-1988
found no evidence to support the propositions that punitive damages are frequently
awarded, the size of the awards is outstanding, the frequency and size of punitive
awards has been rapidly escalating, and these punitive awards are occurring nationwide. See id. at 28, 43, 44, 61. According to this report, the largest awards occurred
where the plaintiffs harm was financial. See id. at 43, 57. Daniels and Martin explained that the reason studies tend to show increases in the amount of awards is that
they are often small and rely on averages rather than the median award. See id. at 4041. As a result, one large award can affect the entire study. See id. at 41. Daniels and
Martin advocate the use of median awards to accurately depict the overall trend in
punitive damage awards because the median discounts the influence of a few tremendous verdicts. See id. at 40-41.
45 See Saks, supra note 40, at 1159-61. Saks cites anecdotes of large punitive damage awards as a strong reason why many believe that there is a current trend to award
punitive damages in the millions of dollars. See id. at 1161; see also Daniels & Martin,
supra note 32, at 14-17 (discussing critics' use of outstanding awards as evidence that
punitive damage awards are increasing in size and frequency).
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woman in a suit against McDonald's after she spilled hot coffee on
her lap.4 6 Similarly, a Texas jury awarded an astounding $3 billion
judgment against Texaco for its tortious interference with a merger
contract between Pennzoil and Getty.47 Recently, an Alabama jury
awarded a physician a $4 million punitive damage verdict against
BMW for its nondisclosure policy regarding paint jobs intended to
refinish damages resulting from the transportation of new cars.4
Without examining the facts and circumstances involved, cases
in which outstanding punitive damages are awarded may highlight
breakdowns in our current civil justice system. The underlying
facts, which usually are not publicized, however, often support
these seemingly disproportionate awards. 49 Furthermore, these are
extraordinary cases, hardly indicative of the overall trend in the
award of punitive damages,5" and the majority of these large judg46 See Liebeck v. McDonald's Restaurants, No. 93-02419-CV, 1995 WL 360309
(D.N.M. Aug. 18, 1994); Gil Smart, Among Lawyers, The Jury Is Out on Trial Reforms:
Attorneys Who Defend Doctors Say Congress Needs To Act, LANCASTER NEW ERA, May 7,
1995, at BI, available in 1995 WL 4968357. A jury awarded $2.7 million to Stella
Liebeck, an elderly woman who spilled scalding hot coffee on her lap. See A Second
Lawsuit is Filed over Spillage of Hot Coffee, HOUSTON CHRON., May 26, 1995, at 34, available in 1995 WL 5905905 [hereinafter A Second Lawsuit]. Most news accounts of the
award failed to mention that Ms. Liebeck received third-degree burns from the scalding hot coffee and spent eight days in the hospital after undergoing "extensive skin
grafts." Id.; see also Lois Haney, Jury Selection in the Era of Tort Reform, TmiAL, Nov. 1995,
at 73.
47 See Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil, Co., 729 S.W.2d 768, 784 (Tex. App. 1987). At trial,
the jury concluded that Texaco intentionally and knowingly interfered with a contract
between Pennzoil and Getty. See id. The cause of action arose out of merger negotiations between Pennzoil and Getty. See id. After signing a memorandum of agreement
to an offer of $110 plus a $5 stub per share, the Getty board issued a press release
detailing the agreement with Pennzoil. See id. at 786. An executive of Getty, however,
continued to solicit other offers in an attempt to find a better deal. See id. Texaco was
eventually contacted, and the Getty board voted to withdraw its previous "counterproposal" to Pennzoil, and voted unanimously to accept Texaco's tender offer of $125
per share. See id. at 787. The jury found that Texaco was aware of the agreement
between Pennzoil and Getty and intentionally caused the breach by Getty. See id. at
798. As a result of this tortious interference by Texaco, the jury awarded Pennzoil
$7.53 billion in compensatory damages and $3 billion in punitive damages. See id. at
784. The Texas court of appeals affirmed the compensatory award but ordered a
remittitur of the punitive award to $1 billion. See id. at 865, 866.
48 See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 646 So. 2d 619, 621 (Ala. 1994).
49 See, e.g., A Second Lawsuit, supra note 46, at 34. For example, McDonald's received hundreds of complaints that their coffee was scalding hot. See Haney, supra
note 46, at 73. In addition, Ms. Liebeck was in the hospital for one week recovering
from her third-degree burns after she received skin grafts. See A Second Lawsuit, supra
note 46, at 34. Similarly, A.H. Robins's deceptive behavior after learning that the
Dalkon Shield posed substantial risks to the health of those women using the product.
See Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co., 738 P.2d 1210, 1240 (Kan. 1987).
50 See Saks, supra note 40, at 1160-62 (discussing the reliance on large punitive
verdicts to indicate the current trend in the award of these damages).
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ments are reduced either by the trial judge, by an appellate court,
or by private settlement.5 ' For example, the McDonald's verdict
was reduced to less than $1 million in a private settlement;5 2 the
Texas court of appeals affirmed the verdict against Texaco on the
condition that the plaintiff file a remittitur 5 of $2 billion, resulting
in an award of $1 billion;5 4 and the BMW verdict was reduced to $2
million on appeal5 5 and eventually ruled "grossly excessive" by the
56
United States Supreme Court.
These highly publicized judgments provided a catalyst for the
pro-business lobby's tort reform and pressured the United States
Supreme Court to review the constitutionality of several allegedly
excessive awards.5 7

51 See Margaret Cronin Fisk, Large Verdicts Become More Fragile Than Ever; Judges
Shave More High Punitive Damage Awards, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 6, 1995, at C2. Large punitive awards were most likely to be reduced or set aside. See id. Of 72 verdicts over $10
million in 1994, 30 were either reduced, set aside, or uncollectible. See id. In addition, in 26 of the 72 cases, trial judges have yet to rule on post-trial motions to set
aside the awards. See id. "During a recent forty month period, 80.9 percent of verdicts
of $1 million or more in New Jersey were reduced in post-trial proceedings or settlements." Henry Gottlieb, Whatever Happened to Those Big Verdicts, N.J. L.J., May 8, 1995,
at 1, 1. Few of these damage awards included punitive damages, and in the 44 cases
examined, plaintiffs received only 57% of the original verdicts. See id. at 18. Punitive
awards are often significantly reduced, and only approximately half of the money
awarded is actually paid to the plaintiff. See Peterson, supra note 42, at iii, iv. For an
example of a significant remittitur, see the discussion of Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co.,
174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 385 (Ct. App. 1981) infra note 164.
52 See A Second Lawsuit, supra note 46, at 34 (stating that the $2.7 million verdict
was reduced to $640,000).
53 See BLACK's LAw DicTIoNARY 1295 (6th ed. 1990). Remittitur is the procedure by
which a court reduces an excessive jury verdict. See id. If the court finds that an award
is "grossly excessive as a matter of law," the court may either direct the plaintiff to
remit part of the award, grant a new trial on the issue of damages, or condition the
denial of a new trial on the plaintiffs remittance of a portion of the award. See id.
54 See Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil, Co., 729 S.W.2d 768, 866 (Tex. App. 1987). The
court of appeals found that the punitive verdict of $3 billion was excessive. See id. In
reaching its conclusion, the Texas court of appeals considered Texaco's conduct, the
deterrent effect of the award, and the type of legal action at issue. See id. The court
proffered that punitive damages sometimes reached a point where the size of the
award "overstates [its] purpose and serves to confiscate rather than to deter or punish." Id.
55 See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 646 So. 2d 619, 629 (Ala. 1994).
56 See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1604 (1996).
57 See Daniels & Martin, supra note 32, at 11-14. The politicization of the current
trend in punitive damages is marked by the public relations campaign launched by
big business interests seeking civil justice reform, particularly in the area of punitive
damages, in an effort to benefit themselves financially. See id. at 11.
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III.

LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL SCRUTINY OF PUNITIVE
DAMAGE AWARDS

A.

Legislative Attacks on Punitive Damages
1.

Nationwide Tort Reform

Since the early 1990s, state lawmakers, pressured by lobbyists
and big business' public relations campaigns, have enacted tort reform legislation.58 "Tort reform" describes legislation aimed at
curbing plaintiffs' common law rights in negligence actions. 59
Common tort reform legislation limits the joint and several liability
of defendants6" and the amount of punitive damages that may be
awarded.61
58 See Annette Wencl & Margaret Brizzolara, The State of the Union, TRLAL, Nov.
1995, at 32. The tort reform measures enacted in the 1990s nationwide are decreasing consumer protection in products liability suits. See id.
59 See Richard C. Turkington, ConstitutionalLimitations on Tort Reform: Have the State
Courts Placed Insurmountable Obstacles in the Path of Legislative Responses to the Perceived
Liability Insurance Crisis?, 32 Vuii. L. REv. 1299, 1299 (1987).
60 For a list of states that have enacted legislation limiting the joint and several
liability of defendants, see Wencl & Brizzolara supra note 58, at 34-35.
61 Many states have enacted punitive damage caps restricting the award to a multiple of actual damages incurred. See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1115.05-5/21115.1 (West Supp. 1996) (capping punitive damages at three times economic damages); IND. CODE § 34-4-34-4 (Supp. 1996) (capping punitive damages at the greater
of three times actual damages or $500,000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-25 (1995) (capping
punitive damages at either $250,000 or three times compensatory damages); TEX. CrV.
PR.c. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.008 (West Supp. 1996) (capping punitive damages at
the greater of either $200,000 or two times actual damages, plus up to $750,000 of
non-economic damages).
Additionally, some states have enacted other types of punitive damages cap. See,
e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-102 (1989) (limiting the award of "exemplary
damages" to a proportion of actual damages); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73 (West Supp.
1996) (creating a presumption, which the plaintiff may overcome with clear and convincing evidence, that an award is excessive if it is more than three times the compensatory damages); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1 (Supp. 1996) (limiting the award of
punitive damages to $250,000 except in products liability cases or cases in which the
defendant acted intentionally to cause harm); NE,. REv. STAT. ANN. § 42.005 (Michie
1996) (limiting punitive damages to three times compensatory damages if compensatory damages are greater than $100,000, or $300,000 if compensatory damages are
greater than $100,000); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-11 (1996) (limiting amount of
exemplary damages to two times compensatory damages or $250,000, whichever is
greater and requiring that a punitive damage award be supported by an award of
compensatory damages); OKLA.STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9.1 (West Supp. 1996) (categorizing the defendant's conduct into three categories and limiting the award of punitive damages accordingly); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1 (Michie 1992) (limitation on
award of punitive damages to $350,000).
For other states that have prohibited the award of punitive damages, see MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 93 (West 1985) (disallowing punitive damages in libel
cases); Id. ch. 258, § 2 (providing that public employees are not liable for punitive
damages); Id. ch. 151B, § 9 (allowing punitive damages for discrimination); NEB.
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The current tort reform movement traces back to the 1970s
medical malpractice crisis in which the medical profession attracted public attention to rising malpractice premiums by threatening to cut off or slow down health care services. 6 2 Much like the
controversy surrounding the medical malpractice crisis of the '70s,
tort reform legislation of the '90s has provoked much debate 63 In
particular, plaintiffs' attorneys on the one side, and big business
and insurance companies on the other, have focused their lobbying efforts on reform aimed at curbing punitive damage awards.64
Proponents of tort reform claim that punitive damages cause
excessive litigation,6 5 subject defendants to multiple and inconsistent punishments,6 6 and result in windfall judgments because jury
CONST. ART. VII, § 5; N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507:16 (Supp. 1992) (prohibiting puni-

tive damages unless specifically allowed by statute).
Still, other states have limited punitive damage through the common law. See
Triangle Sheet Metal Works, Inc. v. Silver, 222 A.2d 220, 225 (Conn. 1966) (limiting
awards to the amount of the plaintiff's attorney's fees); Riggs v. Fremont Mutual Ins.
Co., 270 N.W.2d 654, 655 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978) (limiting the award to exemplary
damages that are compensatory).
62 See Turkington, supra note 59, at 1299. State tort reform legislation enacted in
the 1970s limited the liability of physicians for injuries caused by negligence. See id. at
1300. The medical profession's success in persuading state legislatures in the 1970s to
enact legislative reform aimed at limiting liability for medical malpractice prompted
the insurance industry's current lobby efforts for tort reform. See id. at 1301.
63 See Christopher Placitella, Perspective on New Jersey's Revised Tort Laws, N.J. LAw.,
Aug. 21, 1995, at 1696. In New Jersey, tort reform issues were hotly contested by
plaintiffs' groups such as the Association of Trial Lawyers of America-New Jersey and
the Consumers for Civil Justice and big business interests that employed the most
influential lobbyists in Trenton. See id.
64 For a discussion of the punitive damage reform legislation, see supra note 61.
65 See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (claiming
that punitive awards result in "the encouragement of unnecessary litigation"); see also
Owen, supra note 30, at 396. While large punitive awards may create the "eager-plaintiff' problem, encouraging private attorneys general to police misconduct that would
otherwise go unprosecuted remains important. See id. Although punitive damages
sometimes may act as an incentive to attach frivolous claims to meritorious compensatory suits, the best way to address this problem is through instituting sanctions against
lawyers for maintaining frivolous claims, not by limiting punitive awards. See id.
66 See 1 LINDA L. SCHLUETER & KENNETH R. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES
§§ 4.4(A) (5) (b) (1)-(2), at 118-21 (2d ed. 1989). There were, for example, numerous
inconsistent punitive damage judgments awarded against defendant Richardson-Merrell for the manufacture of the drug MER/29, which caused plaintiffs to develop cataracts. See 1 id.
There has been some concern that multiple punitive damage awards amount to a
constitutional violation. See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 840
(2d Cir. 1967) (stating that multiple punitive awards for the same conduct that is the
subject of mass tort litigation might amount to a violation of due process rights).
In New Jersey, asbestos defendants have been subject to multiple punitive damage awards for the same conduct. SeeJuzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 705 F. Supp.
1053 (D.N.J. 1989). In Juzwin, the asbestos manufacturers successfully challenged the
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decisions are unguided.6 7 Supporters of reform further argue that
juries view the deep pockets of insurance companies and corporations as scapegoats for plaintiffs' injuries. 68 They also allege that
punitive damages are an ever increasing litigation tool used by
plaintiffs' attorneys to expand the scope of discovery.6 9

Advocates of tort reform maintain that there is an increasing
trend by juries toward awarding punitive damages in cases where
the defendant's actions were grossly negligent rather than malicious. 70 Supporters of the legislation argue that larger and more
constitutionality of multiple awards. See id. at 1065. In Juzwin, Judge Sarokin held
that due process limits the number of times a defendant may be punished for a single
action. See id. Judge Sarokin, however, vacated his ruling in Juzwin, requiring that
multiple punitive damage awards be stricken, because the judge concluded that "equitable and practical concerns prevent it from fashioning a fair and effective remedy."
Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 718 F. Supp. 1233, 1236 (D.NJ. 1989). Judge
Sarokin, however, reiterated that repetitive punitive damage awards for the same misconduct are violative of a defendant's due process rights. Id. at 1234.
Judge Sarokin's ruling, however, seems to be a minority opinion and has been
rejected in New Jersey. See Leonen v. Johns-Mansville Corp., 717 F. Supp 272, 284
(D.NJ 1989). Judge Fisher criticized the effect of the Juzwin decision, which was to
preclude a punitive award to anyone but the first plaintiff to make a legitimate claim.
See id. Judge Fisher also noted that class certification of all potential plaintiffs and
submission of evidence of past punitive awards to the jury for their consideration in
determining an appropriate amount to punish and deter would be better alternatives
to address the multiple award problem. See id. Judge Fisher further criticized the
Juzwin decision for assuming that the first punitive damage award would be sufficient
to punish and deter the defendant. See id.; see also Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co., 738
P.2d 1210, 1246 (Kan. 1987) (supporting the proposition that more than one punitive
damage award may be necessary to punish and deter misconduct).
67 See International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 50 (1979) (explaining that juries have tremendous discretion to decide whether and what amount of
punitive damages is warranted in each circumstance); Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 58
(1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (explaining that "the doctrine of punitive damages
permits the award of 'damages' beyond even the most generous and expansive conception of actual injury to the plaintiff"); Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378
F.2d 832, 840-41 (2d Cir. 1967) (arguing that the problem of windfall judgments is
created by punitive damage awards).
68 See Sales & Coles, supra note 11, at 1147-48 (arguing that in jurisdictions where
the jury is permitted to consider the wealth of the defendant in determining the size
of the punitive damages to be awarded, juries are unduly influenced by a corporate
defendant's wealth).
69 See id. at 1157. The mere request for punitive damages in a complaint entitles
the plaintiff to broader, more liberal discovery. See id. According to the authors, the
effect is to impose "excessively oppressive and burdensome discovery on defendants."
Id.
70 See In re the Exxon Valdez, No. A89-0095-CV, 1995 WL 527988 (D. Alaska Jan.
27, 1995). Exxon demonstrates an example of seemingly negligent conduct that resulted in a substantial punitive damage award of $5 billion. See id. at *3.The original
action arose when an Exxon captain crashed his oil ship into an ice block causing an
11 million gallon oil spill. See id.at *4. The evidence showed that Captain Hazelwood, an admitted alcoholic, was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the

180

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:167

frequent punitive damage awards have created an environment
where profit-making is impossible in markets where no tort reform
legislation exists.7 1
Opponents of the tort reform movement, however, contend
that there has been no tort litigation explosion,7 2 and they insist
that claims of outrageous punitive damage awards are fictitious
public relations efforts on behalf of insurance companies and big
business, who are interested in maximizing their profits. 73 Opponents of tort reform assert that while punitive damages continue to
serve their purposes of punishment and deterrence, they act as an
additional incentive for corporations to keep the public's safety in
mind when they consider potential actions. 4
Lobbyists for reform have largely been successful in influencing the passage of tort reform legislation around the country.7 5
The most controversial legislation limits punitive damage awards.7 6
A number of states have capped punitive damage awards while
others have prohibited the award unless specifically provided for by
statute.77
accident. See id. The alleged misconduct in that instance was allowing a known alcoholic to captain an oil vessel. See id.
71 See Sales & Cole, supra note 11, at 1155 (recognizing the possible adverse economic effects of a proliferation of punitive damage awards); see also Roginsky, 378 F.2d
at 839 (discussing the "overkill" effect of multiple punitive damage awards on a corporate defendant).
72 See Wencl & Brizzolara, supranote 58, at 32 (discussing a report that concluded
that in 1993, "only 1 million of the 14.6 million civil cases filed ... were torts cases,
and only 4% of those were products liability cases") (footnotes omitted); see also
MICHAEL RUSTAD, DEMYSTIFYING PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASES: A
SURVEY OF A QUARTER CENTURY OF TRIAL VERDICTS 23 (Roscoe Pound Found. ed.,

1991) (reporting that of all of the products liability cases instituted during the years
1965 to 1990, punitive damages were awarded in only 355 cases).
73 See Eliot Martin Blake, Rumors of Crisis: Considering the Insurance Crisis and Tort
Reform in an Information Vacuum, 37 EMORY L.J. 401, 402, 403 (1988). The insurance
liability crisis is part of a multi-million dollar campaign to promote the idea of an
insurance crisis resulting from litigation growth. See id. at 404, 405. The crisis is the
result of a lack of a neutral method for collecting and analyzing data about the insurance business. See id. at 405 n.5 (stating that an insurance industry official admitted
that their success in passing tort reform was effected "in spite of the fact that [they
did] not have solid statistical evidence from [their] own data").
74 See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 3, at 1317. Punitive damages check corporate
power over consumers. See id. In the context of products liability actions, punitive
damages protect consumers from "objectionable corporate policies" that slip through
the cracks of government safety regulations and the civil law. See id.
75 For a discussion of the nationwide tort reform movement see Wend & Brizzolara, supra note 58, at 34-35 and supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
76 See supra note 61.
77 See supra note 61 (listing state statutes reforming punitive damages).
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2.

The New Jersey Punitive Damage Statute

On June 29, 1995, the New Jersey Legislature passed a five bill
tort reform package. 7" The package was part of Governor Christine Todd Whitman's plan to create incentives for big business to
operate in New Jersey7 9 by remedying a legal system that "had
swung too far to the side of litigious plaintiffs."" ° The five-bill tort
reform package included the punitive damage cap bill (the Bill),
which was introduced in 1994 to limit the frequency and amount
of punitive damage awards. 8" As the driving force behind the legislation, Senator Gerald Cardinale, the Bill's sponsor,8 2 cited strong
public opinion that damages have been awarded haphazardly for
mere negligent actions. 11 According to Senator Cardinale, the Bill
provided "reasonable and fair standards" for awarding punitive
damages.'8
The Bill, as originally proposed to the Senate Commerce Committee (the Commerce Committee), contained a cap on punitive
damages equal to three times the compensatory damages
awarded.8 5 In order to get the Bill out of the Commerce Commit78 See Michael Booth, Tort Reform Package Wins Final Legislative Approval N.J. L.J.,
June 26, 1995, at 4, 4. The punitive damage statute is codified at N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 2A:15-5.9 to -5.15 (West Supp. 1996). The other four bills to pass the New Jersey
Legislature inJune 1995 were: (1) S-1493, which requires plaintiffs claiming malpractice cases against members of "learned professions," for example doctors, lawyers, and
nurses, to procure an expert's certificate of merit within 60 days of serving the complaint; (2) S-1494, which requires that to be held jointly and severally liable for 100%
of the plaintiff's injuries, the defendant must be at least 60% at fault except in environmental cases; (3) S-1495, which provides retailers with immunity from damage
claims in a products liability suit unless the retailer took part in designing, manufacturing, or packaging the product; and (4) S-1497, which provides the same protection
as S-1495 to medical personnel. Booth, supra, at 4.
79 See Michael Booth, Tort Reform Bills Signed, N.J. L.J., July 3, 1995, at 8, 8. The
New Jersey Tort Reform package had the support of the most powerful industries in
NewJersey. SeePlacitella, supra note 63, at 1696. In addition, there were strong lobbying efforts opposing the passage of the reform. See id. In particular, consumer
groups, labor unions, civil rights organizations, and the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) joined to form Consumers for Civil Justice. See id.
80 Michael Booth, Governor Urges Bar to Back Tort Reform, N.J. L.J., May 22, 1995, at
1, 17 (discussing Governor Whitman's contentions that the tort reform legislation
"would bring a balance back to the [civil justice] system").
81 See Punitive Damages Act, Pub. L. 1995, ch. 142 (Sponsor's Statement). Senator
Gerald Cardinale noted that the original function of punitive damage awards was "to
punish defendants for malicious or wanton actions and to defer others from engaging
in similar activities." Id.
82 -See Booth, supra note 78, at 4. Senator Gerald Cardinale, a republican from
Bergen County, sponsored the Bill. See id.

83 See id.
84

See id.

85 See i.
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tee, however, and onto the floor of the New Jersey Senate for a
vote, the Commerce Committee amended the Bill and eliminated
the cap.8 6 The Commerce Committee eventually reported favorably on the amended Bill on November 10, 1994.87
On December 15, 1994, the Bill, as amended by the Commerce Committee, passed the Senate by a vote of thirty-three to
three.8 8 The Bill was then sent to the New Jersey State Assembly
86 See id. The punitive damage cap died in the Senate Commerce Committee,
which was chaired by Senator Cardinale, because Republican Senator Jack Sinagra
refused to cast the necessary fourth vote to move the bill out of the Committee with
the cap. See id. Senator Sinagra cited his opposition to the tobacco and asbestos
lobbying efforts as the reason for withholding his vote. See id.
87 See Punitive Damages Act, Pub. L. 1995, ch. 142 (Senate Committee Statement).
88 See id.(Senate Comment to S-1496). The New Jersey Senate at the time of voting on the amended bill was composed of 24 Republicans and 16 Democrats. See NEW
JERSEY LAWYER'S DIARY & MANUAL 198-202 (107th ed. 1996). The Bill passed overwhelmingly because the the Commerce Committee eliminated the cap on the amount
of damages, leaving a considerably less controversial bill. See Booth, supra note 78, at
4.
The only existing statutory law addressing punitive damages prior to the Punitive
Damage Statute pertained to products liability actions and was contained in N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:58C-5 (West 1987) (amended by Punitive Damages Act, Pub. L. 1995, ch.
142). The statute provided that punitive damages could be awarded to the plaintiff
only upon showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the harm caused to the
plaintiff was the result of the defendant's acts or omissions, and that these acts or
omissions were triggered by "actual malice" or guided by a "wanton and willful disregard" for the protection of others who might have foreseeably been harmed. See id.
§ 2A:58C-5(a).
The statute further provided that the trier of fact would determine awards in a
bifurcated proceeding. See id. § 2A:58C-5(b). First, the trier shall decide whether and
if so, to what extent compensatory damages shall be awarded. See id. During this
stage, information pertaining to punitive damages shall not be admissible. See id. Second, the trier of fact shall consider in another proceeding whether punitive damages
shall be awarded. See id.
In determining whether to award punitive damages, the statute directed the trier
of fact to consider:
(1) The likelihood at the relevant time that serious harm would arise
from the tortfeasor's conduct;
(2) The tortfeasor's awareness of reckless disregard of the likelihood
that the serious harm at issue would arise from the tortfeasor's conduct;
(3) The conduct of the tortfeasor upon learning that its initial conduct
would likely cause harm; and
(4) The duration of the conduct or any concealment of it by the
tortfeasor.
Id. § 2A:58C-5(b)(1)-(4).
Upon determining that punitive damages are appropriate, the statute further required the trier of fact to determine the amount of those damages. See id. § 2A:58C5(d). The statute directed the jury to determine the amount upon considering all
relevant evidence, including, but not limited to:
(1) All relevant evidence relating to the factors set forth in subsection b
of this section;
(2) The profitability of the misconduct to the tortfeasor;
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Insurance Committee (the Insurance Committee) for further scrutiny.8 9 OnJune 1, 1995, the Insurance Committee reported favorably on a further amended version of the Bill, which included a
punitive damage cap.9 0 The Bill, as amended by the Insurance
Committee, provided that a defendant shall not be liable for more
than five times the amount of compensatory damages or $350,000,
whichever is greater.9
The revised Bill passed the Assembly by a forty-five to twentyeight vote, 92 and the Senate passed it by a twenty-one to sixteen
(3) When the misconduct was terminated; and
(4) The financial condition of the tortfeasor.
Id. § 2A:58C-5(d) (1)-(4).
The Bill, as amended by the Commerce Committee, provided five changes to the
existing law in New Jersey. Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-4 (West 1987)
(amended by Punitive Damages Act, Pub. L. 1995, ch. 142) with Punitive Damages
Act, Pub. L. 1995, ch. 142 (Senate Commerce Committee Statement). First, the Bill
required that punitive damages be specifically sought in the complaint. See Punitive
Damages Act, Pub. L. 1995, ch. 142 (Senate Commerce Committee Statement). Second, the Bill stated that a punitive damage award must be supported by an award of at
least $500 compensatory or nominal damages. See id. Third, and most significantly,
the Bill raised the burden of proof for the plaintiff from a preponderance of the
evidence to clear and convincing proof that the defendant acted with "actual malice"
or with a "wanton and willful disregard of persons." Id. Fourth, the Bill firmly stated
that mere negligence or gross negligence would not be sufficient to recover punitive
damages. See id. Rather, the Bill required "actual malice" or a "willful and wanton
disregard of persons." Id. Fifth, the Bill provided that the trial judge may reduce or
eliminate an award for punitive damages if it is unreasonable in its amount and not
justified in the circumstances of the case, in light of the purpose to punish and deter
that defendant from repeating that conduct. See id. Most notably, the Bill as
amended by the Commerce Committee excluded a cap. See id.
89 See Booth, supra note 78, at 4.
90 See id. The Insurance Committee carved out exceptions to the cap in the areas
of bias crimes, discrimination, AIDS testing disclosure, sexual abuse, and drunk driving. See Punitive Damages Act, Pub. L. 1995, ch. 142 (Assembly Insurance Committee
Statement). In addition, the Assembly Bill amended the Senate Bill and provided
that punitive damages may only be awarded where compensatory damages have been
awarded in the first stage of the bifurcated trial. See id. In a bifurcated trial, the first
part of the trial pertains to the conduct of the defendant and the damages incurred.
See id. If liability is established in the first stage of trial, then the court must consider
whether the award of punitive damages is appropriate in the second stage. See id.
91 See Booth, supra note 78, at 4. Governor Whitman's administration initiated
efforts to include a punitive damages cap. See id. A compromise was reached at which
the punitive damages would be limited to five times the compensatory damages or
$350,000, whichever is greater. See id.
92 See id. Democrats were unable to kill the Bill on the floor of the Assembly. See
id. Assemblyman Joseph Charles of Jersey City, repeatedly questioned the Assembly
Bill's sponsor, Claire Farragher, a Republican Assemblywoman from Monmouth
County, about the potential effects of the Bill. See id. Assemblyman Charles asked
whether the Bill would lead to lower insurance premiums. See id. Assemblywoman
Farragher responded that she could offer no promises, but that it is a "known fact
that.., liability insurance rates have gotten really kind of out of hand because of the
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margin.93 On June 29, 1995, the same day it passed both houses of
the legislature, Governor Whitman signed the legislation.94
tort system." Id. Assemblyman Charles also expressed concern that there may now be
plaintiffs who are not justly compensated for their injuries. See id.
93 See id. The vote was split mainly along party lines. See id. Senators Jack Sinagra
of Middlesex County and Joseph Bubba of Passaic County joined 14 Democrats in
voting against the Bill. See id. The lone Democrat voting in favor of the Bill was
Senator Donald Rice. See id.
Senator Rice was rumored to have sold out to the Republicans in exchange for
budget considerations by Governor Whitman's office. See id. Senator Rice said that
he supported the Bill because he believed that it balanced the equities between both
plaintiffs and defendants and also because he believed that the Bill would bring business to Newark. See id. Donald Caminiti, a former president of the Association of
Trial Lawyers of America-New Jersey, referring to Newark's large urban population
noted, "[iut's ironic that somebody who represents a constituency which could benefit
the most from laws that promote safe products voted against it." Id.
94 See Booth, supra note 79, at 8. The Bill is codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:15-5.9
to -5.15 (West Supp. 1996). The new statute provides that "[ain award of punitive
damages must be specifically prayed for in the complaint." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:155.11. Additionally, the statute requires proof of malice or willful disregard by clear
and convincing evidence:
Punitive damages may be awarded to the plaintiff only if the plaintiff
proves, by clear and convincing evidence, that the harm suffered was
the result of the defendant's acts or omissions, and such acts or omissions were actuated by actual malice or accompanied by a wanton and
willful disregard of persons who foreseeably might be harmed by those
acts or omissions. This burden of proof may not be satisfied by proof of
any degree of negligence, including gross negligence.
Id. § 2A:15-5.15(a). In determining whether to award punitive damages, the statute
directs the fact-finder to consider all relevant evidence, including but not limited to
the following:
(1) The likelihood at the relevant time, that serious harm would arise
from the defendant's conduct;
(2) The defendant's awareness of reckless disregard of the likelihood
that the serious harm at issue would arise from the defendant's conduct;
(3) The conduct of the defendant upon learning that its initial conduct
would likely cause harm; and
(4) The duration of the conduct or any concealment of it by the
defendant.
Id. § 2A:15-5.12(b). The statute further directs the fact-finder to determine the
amount of an award upon considering all relevant evidence, including, but not limited to, the following:
(1) All relevant evidence relating to the factors set forth in subsection
b. of this section;
(2) The profitability of the misconduct to the defendant;
(3) When the misconduct was terminated; and
(4) The financial condition of the defendant.
Id. § 2A:15-5.12(c). In any case involving a punitive damage claim, the statute allows
for a bifurcated trial upon the defendant's request. See id. § 2A:15-5.13(a). The statute provides that
[i]n the first stage of a bifurcated trial, the trier of fact shall determine
liability for compensatory damages and the amount of compensatory
damages or nominal damages. Evidence relevant only to the issues of
punitive damages shall not be admissible in this stage.
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ConstitutionalScrutiny

1. Deferential Era of Review
In addition to legislative attempts to control punitive damages,
these awards have been attacked through the judicial system. Defendants' counsel have challenged the constitutionality of punitive
damages as excessive under the Eighth Amendment's Excessive
Fines Clause" and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.9 6 As a result, the United States Supreme Court has

directly addressed the issue of the excessiveness of punitive damage
awards five times,9 7 most recently in BMW of North America, Inc. v.
Gore in May 1996.98

In the United States Supreme Court's first decision addressing
the size of punitive damage awards, Browning-Ferris Industries Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,99 the Court rejected an Excessive
Fines Clause challenge to a $6 million punitive damage award.' 0 0
Id. § 2A:15-5.13(b). Further, the statute conditions the award of punitive damages in
the following manner: "Punitive damages may be awarded only if compensatory damages have been awarded in the first stage of the trial. An award of nominal damages
cannot support an award of punitive damages." Id. § 2A:15-5.13(c).
Finally, the statute requires the trial judge to review a punitive damage award:
Before entering judgment for an award of punitive damages, the trial
judge shall ascertain that the award is reasonable in its amount andjustified in the circumstances of the case, in light of the purpose to punish
the defendant and to deter that defendant from repeating such conduct. If necessary to satisfy the requirements of this section, the judge
may reduce the amount of or eliminate the award of punitive damages.
Id. § 2A:15-5.14(a). Finally, the statute includes the following cap for punitive damage awards: "No defendant shall be liable for punitive damages in any action in
amount in excess of five times the liability of that defendant for compensatory damages or $350,000 whichever is greater." Id. § 2A:15-5.14(b).
95 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
96 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Due Process Clause provides:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
and immunities of the citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of
the laws.
Id.
97 See generally BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996); Honda Motor
Co. v. Oberg, 114 S.Ct. 2331 (1994); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.,
509 U.S. 443 (1993); Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
98 See BMW 116 S. Ct. at 1593.
99 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
100 See id. at 260. In Browning-Ferris,the plaintiff, Kelco Disposal, Inc., brought tortious interference with a contract and antitrust claims against Browning-Ferris. See id.
at 261. Both parties operated in the waste disposal business, and the claims revolved
around pricing efforts by Browning-Ferris to allegedly drive Kelco out of business. See
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The Court, however, concluded that the Eighth Amendment
Clause does not apply in civil cases where the state shares no part
in the recovery.10 1 The Court declined to address whether the
award was excessive under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the petitioner did not preserve the is10 2
sue for appeal.
In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,10 3 the Court rejected a Due Process Clause challenge to Alabama's common-law
method of determining and reviewing punitive damage awards. 10 4
Although the Court declined to strike down a seemingly excessive
award, the effect of the Court's holding is to require procedural
id. at 260. The jury found for Kelco and awarded $51,146 in compensatory damages
and $6 million in punitive damages. See id. at 262.
101 See id. at 264.
102 See id. at 277. The Court noted that, consistent with the law of other states,
Vermont law requires that awards may only be set aside where they are manifestly and
grossly excessive. See id. at 278 n.24 (citing Glidden v. Skinner, 458 A.2d 1142, 1145
(Vt. 1983)).
103 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
104 See id. at 19. In Haslip, the defendant, Pacific Mutual, was subject to a suit arising out of its insurance agent's alleged fraud on the plaintiffs. See id. at 5. The agent
allegedly failed to remit any of the insurance premiums and as a result, the plaintiffs'
policies were canceled. See id. One of the plaintiffs, Ms. Haslip, was subsequently
hospitalized and was forced to incur all her medical costs for the visit because her
policy had been canceled. See id. The jury returned a verdict of $1,040,000 for the
plaintiff, Ms. Haslip. See id. at 7. The Alabama Supreme Court upheld the punitive
award on the basis that the agent's actions amounted to deceit and willful fraud. See
id.
In reviewing damage awards, Alabama courts follow the standards set forth in
Hammond v. City of Gadsden, 493 So. 2d 1374 (Ala. 1986). Pursuant to Hammond upon
review, a trial judge should consider: "the culpability of the defendant's conduct, the
desirability of discouraging others from similar conduct, the impact upon the parties, . . . and other factors, such as the impact upon innocent third parties." 493 So.
2d at 1379. (citations omitted). Hammond also requires that trial courts must "reflect
in the record the reasons for interfering with ajury verdict, or refusing to do so, on
grounds of excessiveness of the damages." Id. In Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So. 2d
218 (Ala. 1989) and CentralAlabama Electric Cooperative v. Tapley, 546 So. 2d 371 (Ala.
1989), the Alabama court further refined the factors for determining whether an
award was excessive on review: a) a "reasonable relationship" must exist between the
punitive damages award and the potential harm likely to occur as a result of the defendant's conduct in addition to any actual damages that have occurred; b) the degree of reprehensibility and duration of the defendant's conduct, the defendant's
awareness or concealment of any hazards, and "the existence and frequency of similar
past conduct;" c) the profits resulting from the wrongful conduct and the desirability
of extinguishing that profit and of having the defendant incur a loss; d) the defendant's financial position; e) the costs incurred during the course of litigation; f) any
criminal sanctions that may be imposed on the defendant may be considered in mitigation; and g) the existence of other damage awards against the defendant for the
same conduct may also be considered in mitigation. See id. (citing Green Oil, 539 So.
2d at 223-24).
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protections ensuring that jury discretion to award punitive damages is not unlimited. 5 Specifically, the Court decided that a
state's civil justice system for awarding punitive damages may not
delegate unlimited discretion to the jury and that due process also
requires meaningful judicial review of jury awards to prevent arbitrary judgments. 106
In addressing the amount of the punitive damages awarded to
the plaintiff, the Haslip Court recognized that a "mathematical
bright line" cannot be drawn between acceptable and unconstitutional awards, but the Court stated that a reasonable relationship
must exist between the actual harm incurred by the plaintiff and
the amount of the punitive damage award."0 ' In Haslip, the punitive award was four times the amount of the actual harm incurred
by the plaintiff, but the Court, relying on the procedural protections inherent in the Alabama common law, held that the constitutionally required "reasonable relationship" existed.1 0
The Supreme Court rejected another due process challenge to
an allegedly excessive punitive damage award in TXO Production
Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp. °9 In TXO, the Court upheld a $10
million punitive damage award that was 526 times greater than the
compensatory award of $19,000.1" Affirming the punitive award,
the Supreme Court modified the "reasonable relationship" test of
Haslip to include harm that potentially could have resulted from
the defendant's misconduct. 1 ' Considering the potential harm,
the Court found that the ratio between the punitive damage award
and the potential harm that the plaintiff could have incurred was
1 12
at most ten to one.

See Green i, 539 So. 2d at 223-24.
See Haslip, 449 U.S. at 18, 19. The Court upheld the award because it resulted
from a jury's consideration of a number of objective criteria and was thereafter sub-.
jected to procedural review in accordance with established Alabama common law. See
id. at 22, 23.
107 See id. at 18, 22.
108 See id. at 18, 21.
109 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
110 See id. at 459, 462. In the case, TXO recorded a frivolous quitclaim deed and
then sued Alliance for title to a West Virginia tract of land. See id. at 447. Alliance
counterclaimed against TXO for slander of title. See id. The West Virginia Supreme
Court upheld the award, finding that TXO's behavior constituted intentional wrongdoing. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 419 S.E.2d 870, 890 (W. Va.
1992).
111 See TXO, 509 U.S. at 460.
112 See id. at 462. The Supreme Court's decision in TXO, however, has been criticized for eroding the true judicial review that Hasliphad established because the TXO
Court declined to require that trial judges articulate their reasoning for upholding or
remitting punitive damage awards. See id. at 465. Many thought that the Court would
105
106
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In HondaMotor Co. v. Oberg,n sI the Court focused on the procedural protections guaranteed by the Due Process Clause. 1 4 At
trial, the jury awarded $919,390 in compensatory damages and $5
million in punitive damages.1 15 The Oberg Court held that Oregon,
the only state that does not provide forjudicial review of the size of
punitive damage awards, allocated unlimited discretion to juries
and consequently denied the defendant procedural due process.1 1 6
In reversing and remanding the case to the Oregon Supreme
Court, the Court did not analyze the size of the award pursuant to
the "reasonable relationship" test established in TXO and Haslip.11 7
Despite the large punitive damage awards in the cases discussed above, the Supreme Court's review of punitive awards remained extremely deferential to lower courts' decisions. As long as
state civil justice systems maintained factors forjudges and juries to
consider in deciding when to award, how much to award, and
whether an award was proper, the Supreme Court gave the damage
awards a strong presumption of validity. In fact, prior to BMW of
North America, Inc. v. Gore, the Supreme Court had not ruled a punitive damage award excessive. 18 The Court's decision in BMW,
however, provided the impetus for a reversal of this trend of deferential review.
2.

BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore

The Supreme Court recently reviewed the constitutionality of
take this opportunity to set down substantive due process standards for punitive damage awards. See Owen, supranote 30, at 402, 403; see also, Nancy Dragutsky, Walking the
Invisible Line of Punitive Damages: TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.,
21 PEPP. L. REv. 909, 950-57 (1994) (discussing justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion, which determined that according to Haslip, the award violated procedural due
process standards, noting that the West Virginia trial court failed to explain its reasoning for upholding the award and that, unlike in Haslip, the West Virginia Supreme
Court's review of the punitive damage award was not guided by established common
law standards).
113 114 S. Ct. 2331 (1994).
114 See id. at 2339.
115 See id. at 2334. The plaintiff, Oberg, sued Honda on a products liability design
defect claim where a three-wheel all terrain vehicle capsized and severely injured the
plaintiff. See id.
116 See id. at 2342.
117 See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 460-61 (1993);
Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18, 21-22.
118 See supra notes 95-117 and accompanying text (discussing BMW of N. Am., Inc.
v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996); Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331 (1994);
TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993); Pacific Mutual
Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco
Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989)).
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a punitive damage award in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore.1 19
In contrast to its previous decisions addressing the size of punitive
damage awards, the Court found the award unconstitutionally excessive and, therefore, in violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.1 2 ° In doing so, the Court provided tort
defendants with long awaited constitutional protection from excessive punitive damage awards.
In BMW, an Alabama jury awarded $4 million in damages to
the plaintiff, Dr. Gore, to punish BMW for its unscrupulous practice of repainting cars that were damaged during transport and attempting to pass them off as new. 12 1 Rejecting BMW's post-trial
motion to set aside the verdict, the trial court judge held that the
122
award was not excessive.

On appeal, the Alabama Supreme Court also held that the punitive award was not constitutionally excessive, but ruled in BMW's
favor, concluding that punishment for conduct including acts
done in other jurisdictions exceeded the state's power under the
Federal Constitution.1 23 As a result, the court reduced the punitive
damage award to $2 million. 124 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to clarify the standard for a constitutionally excessive punitive
damage award.'

25

The Court, in a five to four opinion authored by Justice Stevens, declared that the award, which amounted to over 500 times
the actual damages incurred by Dr. Gore, was unconstitutionally
excessive.1 26 In determining the appropriate level of review, the
Court followed the TXO standard, which stated that in order for a
119 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996).
120 See id. at 1604.

121 See id. at 1591. The Alabama trial court explained the jury award of $4 million
by multiplying the number of refinished cars that were sold in the United States,
1000, by $4000, the approximate decrease in value of the Gore vehicle. See BMW of
N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 646 So. 2d 619, 627 (Ala. 1994).
122 See BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1591.
123 See BMW, 646 So. 2d at 627.
124 See id. at 629. Although the Alabama Supreme Court reduced the award to $2
million, the court did not explain its method for calculating the measure of punitive
damages. See id. If the courts were to limit the award to represent only sales in Alabama, the award would be $56,000. See BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1595 n.l1. For a further
discussion see Brief of Amicus Curiae Richard L. Blatt, et al. In Support of Petitioner,
BMW of N. Amer., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996) (No. 94-896) (arguing that the
appellate court's substitution of a remitted amount without providing an explanation
violates procedural due process according to Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct.
2331, 2340-41 (1994)).
125 115 S. Ct. 932 (1995).

126 BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1604. Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer
joined Justice Stevens in the majority opinion. Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opin-
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punitive award to be unconstitutionally excessive, the award must
be "grossly excessive" in relation to the state interests of punishment and deterrence. 127 Initially, Justice Stevens stated that Alabama's interest in protecting consumers from BMW's
128
nondisclosure policy was limited to BMW's conduct in Alabama.
As a result, Justice Stevens agreed with the Alabama Supreme
Court's analysis of the jury verdict because the jury improperly con12
sidered damages caused by BMW's conduct outside of Alabama. 1
The Court then analyzed the size of the remitted award in relation to Alabama's interest in regulating BMW's conduct within
Alabama. 3 ° The Court announced that fundamental notions of
constitutional fairness require that individuals receive notice that
their conduct is proscribed and will subject them to a severe punishment.' 3 ' To enforce this notion of fairness, the Court used
three guideposts to determine whether the award was grossly
excessive. 13

First, the Court focused on the degree of reprehensibility of
the conduct at issue.13 3 Justice Stevens determined that BMW's
policy of nondisclosure of minor repairs was not especially egregious because, although economic harm was inflicted upon Dr.
Gore, BMW's conduct did not display a reckless indifference for
the health and safety of Alabama consumers. 4
Second, the Court analyzed the ratio of the punitive damage
ion in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion in
which Chief Justice Rehnquist joined. See id. at 1589.
127 See id. at 1591 (citing TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S.
443, 456 (1993)).
128 See id. at 1597. The Court mentioned concerns of state sovereignty and comity
as to each individual state's ability to designate which nondisclosure policies would be
considered unlawful misconduct. See id. Additionally, the Court stressed that Alabama did not have the authority to attempt to change BMW's nationwide policy
where according to BMW, its practice of nondisclosure was not proscribed by at least
25 states. See id. at 1594.
129 See id. at 1598.
130 See id.
131 See BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1598.
132 See id. at 1598-99.
'33 See id. at 1599 (quoting Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371 (1852)
(stating the long-standing rule that "exemplary damages imposed on a defendant
should reflect the 'enormity of his offense"')).
134 See id. The Court stated that unlike the defendants' conduct in TXO and Haslip,
BMW made "no deliberate false statements, acts of affirmative misconduct, or concealment of evidence of improper motive." Id. at 1601. The Court further stated that
in general, an "omission of a material fact may be less reprehensible than a deliberate
false statement, particularly when there is a good-faith basis for believing that no duty
to disclose exists." Id.
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award to the actual harm incurred by the plaintiff.13 5 Citing TXO
and Haslip,Justice Stevens noted that the Constitution dictates that
a punitive award bear some "reasonable relationship" to actual
damages.'13 The Court emphasized that the $2 million award was
500 times the amount of the actual harm incurred by Dr. Gore. 7
The Court also applied the modified test established in TXO and
stated there was no evidence that BMW's conduct could have potentially resulted in any additional harm to Dr. Gore.1 3 1 Concluding that the punitive award was not reasonable in relation to the
actual harm, Justice Stevens emphasized that while there is not a
mathematically correct constitutional award, an award that is 500
times the amount of actual damages is outstanding and "must
3 9
surely 'raise a suspicious judicial eyebrow.' "1
Finally, the Court compared the punitive damage award to the
civil and criminal penalties that could be imposed for similar misconduct.1 4 The Court declared that the award of $2 million was
substantially greater than any economic sanction that BMW could
have reasonably believed would be imposed for its conduct.' 4 '
Justice Stevens concluded that, consistent with its decision in
Haslip, the Court was "not prepared to draw a bright line marking
the limits of a constitutionally acceptable punitive damages
award." 142 Pursuant to Justice Stevens' application of the three
guideposts to the current circumstance, however, the majority held
that the award here clearly crossed the line of an unconstitutionally
excessive award.

143

id.
BMW, 116 S.Ct. at 1601 (citing TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources
Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 454 (1993); Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 449 U.S. 1, 23
(1991)). In Haslip, the Court examined the ratio of actual harm to the punitive damage award. See 449 U.S. at 23. The Haslip Court held that a punitive damage award
four times the amount of compensatory damages satisfied the reasonable relationship
test and did not "cross the line into the area of constitutional impropriety." Id. at 24
(footnote omitted). The TXO Court stressed that the appropriate inquiry to determine whether the award is reasonable is whether there is a reasonable relationship
between the punitive damages award and the harm that is likely to occur from the
defendant's conduct and the harm that actually occurred. See TXO, 509 U.S. at 460.
In TXO, the Court upheld a $10,000,000 punitive award where the potential harm to
the plaintiff could have resulted in $1,000,000 in damages. See id. at 460, 462.
'37 See BM, 116 S. Ct. at 1602.
138 See id.
139 See id. at 1603 (quoting TXO, 509 U.S. at 481 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting)).
140 See id.
141 See id. In Alabama, the maximum civil penalty authorized for a violation of the
Alabama Deceptive Trade Practices Act is $2000. See ALA. CODE § 8-19-11(b) (1993).
142 BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1604.
143 See id. The Court reversed the judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court and
135 See
136 See

192

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:167

Justice Breyer wrote a concurring opinion in which Justices
O'Connor and Souterjoined." Justice Breyer reiterated the importance of curtailing jury discretion to award punitive damages14 5
by maintaining "legal standards that provide 'reasonable constraints' within which 'discretion is exercised,' that assure 'meaningful and adequate review by the trial court whenever a jury has
fixed the punitive damages,' and permit appellate review [that]
makes certain that the punitive damages" are constitutionally
46
acceptable.1
Justices Scalia and Ginsburg wrote separate dissenting opinions criticizing the majority's holding as an intrusion into an area
traditionally reserved for states. 14 7 Additionally, Justice Ginsburg
rebuked the majority for not according the Alabama Supreme
Court decision the "presumption of legitimacy" to which it was
entitled.14
IV.

A.

CONCLUSION

Effect of Punitive Damages Cap
1.

Failure to Cure Vague Jury Standards

Claims that punitive damage awards are out of control are a
result of public relations efforts on behalf of big business interests.' 4 9 The public relations campaigns point to extraordinary punitive verdicts and rely on studies that are skewed by these large
and infrequent awards.' 5 ° In addition, when the media cites large
punitive verdicts as evidence that the awards are unchecked, the
media often fails to mention the egregious underlying facts of each
case."' Finally, those who launch these campaigns do not discuss
remanded the case for either a determination of a constitutionally acceptable award
to protect the interests of Alabama consumers or a new trial. See id.
144 See id.
145 See id. at 1604-06 (Breyer, J., concurring).
146 Id. at 1605 (BreyerJ., concurring) (citing Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip,
499 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1991)).
147 See BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1610 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 1614 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
148 See id. at 1616 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
149 Due to the potential economic effect on their financial statements, these corporations became annoyed with punitive awards and launched campaigns in the form of
tort reform against punitive damages. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
150 See Saks, supra note 40, at 1159-62 (explaining that much of the evidence about
the current trends in the civil litigation system comes from stories of large punitive
damage awards); Daniels & Martin, supra note 32, at 40-41 (noting that use of extraordinary awards skews the average punitive award).
151 See Fisk, supra note 51, at C2. In launching these campaigns, public relations
campaigns fail to mention the specifics of the defendant's misconduct in those cases,
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that these damage awards are often reduced either by the trial
judge or on appeal.' 5 2
Despite the lack of evidentiary support, corporations have
been successful in selling the idea of a punitive damage explosion
to lawmakers.' 5 3 These corporations, however, are not interested
in "reforming" the law to provide juries with meaningful standards
to consider; they are only concerned with limiting their potential
punitive damage liability. The New Jersey Punitive Damage Act is
evidence of this mentality. The statute simply codified the New
Jersey common-law standards for juries to consider in determining
when and how much punitive damages to award. 1 54 Not surprisand the subsequent reductions of these awards by post-trial reviews or post-trial settlements. See Daniels & Martin, supra note 32, at 9.
152 For a discussion regarding post-trial reductions of punitive damage awards see
supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
153 Through extensive public relations campaigns, corporations have used society's
mistrust of juries to support the enactment of legislation. For example, juries are
frequently accused of using the doctrine to compensate plaintiffs for non-physical
injuries. In addition, juries are increasingly seen as sympathetic to plaintiffs. Juries
are also allegedly attempting to balance the equities by reaching into the deep pockets of corporate defendants and awarding outstanding windfall damage awards.
154 Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.12(a) (West Supp. 1996) with DiGiovanni v.
Pessel, 55 N.J. 188, 190, 260 A.2d 510, 511-12 (1970). The NewJersey statute provides
that an award of punitive damages must be supported by actual malice and states that
negligence is not sufficient. See § 2A:15-5.12(a). Similarly, New Jersey common law
has long required actual malice. See DiGiovanni,55 N.J. at 190, 260 A.2d at 511-12.
Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.12(b) (West Supp. 1996) with Fischer v. JohnsManville Corp., 103 N.J. 643, 672-73, 512 A.2d 466, 481-82 (1986). The NewJersey
statute provides that in determining whether to award punitive damages, the factfinder shall consider: 1) the likelihood that serious harm would result from the defendant's conduct; 2) the defendant's consciousness of the likelihood that the serious
harm would result from the defendant's conduct; 3) the reaction of the defendant
upon learning that its conduct would cause the harm; and 4) the duration of the
alleged misconduct or any efforts to conceal the conduct. See § 2A:15-5.12(b). These
standards were initially provided by the NewJersey Supreme Court during the course
of the asbestos litigation in the 1980s. See Fischer, 103 N.J. at 672-73, 512 A.2d at 48182. Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.12(c) (West Supp. 1996) with Leimgruber v.
Claridge Assoc., 73 N.J. 450, 456, 375 A.2d 652, 655-56 (1977). The common-law
standards for juries to consider in determining the amount of punitive damages to be
awarded is also codified in the new statute. See § 2A:15-5.12(c). In Leimgruber, the
court stated that there was no requirement of a reasonable proportional relationship
between punitive and compensatory damages. See 73 NJ. at 456, 375 A.2d at 655-56.
Instead, the court set out factors to be considered in determining the amount of
punitive damages to be awarded. See id. The NewJersey Supreme Court stated that in
determining how much to be awarded, juries may consider whether the award furthers the punishment and deterrent goals in assessing punitive damages, all of the
circumstances surrounding the particular occurrence including the nature of the
wrongdoing, the extent of the harm inflicted, the intent of the party committing the
act, the wealth of the perpetrator, as well as any mitigating circumstances that may
operate to reduce the amount of damages. See id., 375 A.2d at 655-66.
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ingly though, the powerful influences behind the legislation ensured that the statute severely restricts jury discretion as to the size
of punitive awards by enacting a cap.
The New Jersey common-law standards for awarding punitive
damages, which have been transposed into the new statute, have
long been criticized by opponents of the punitive damage doctrine
as according juries too much discretion. 5 ' The result has been
inconsistent judgments, awarding punitive damages in seemingly
negligent situations, 5 6 and denying awards in gross misconduct
155 See Leimgruber, 73 N.J. at 456, 457, 375 A.2d at 656 (stating that the common-law
standards do not effectively guide juries through the punitive damage analysis because the factors for juries to consider are vague in instructing when an award is warranted and if so, how much of a punitive award would punish and deter the
defendant).
The NewJersey common law provides that punitive damages are awarded to punish the offender and to deter similar conduct in the future. See Nappe v. Anschelewitz, Barr, Ansell & Bonello, 97 N.J. 37, 48, 477 A.2d 1224, 1230 (1984);
Leimgruber,73 N.J. at 454, 375 A.2d at 654. In order to recover punitive damages, New
Jersey case law requires that a plaintiff's conduct must be shown to be "wantonly reckless or malicious." Nappe, 97 N.J. at 49, 477 A.2d at 1230. In other words, the defendant must engage in "intentional wrongdoing" or an "evil-minded act." Id. at 49, 477
A.2d at 1230 (citing DiGiovanni, 55 N.J. at 190, 260 A.2d at 511-12). This "willful or
wanton" conduct requires that there be a deliberate act or omission with knowledge
of a high degree of probability of harm and reckless indifference to consequences.
See Krauth v. Israel Geller & Buckingham Homes, Inc., 31 N.J. 270, 277, 157 A.2d 129,
132-33 (1960) (holding that a property owner's failure to install a railing on a balcony
while his house was under construction, was not willful and wanton misconduct, precluding the fireman who sustained injuries falling from the balcony from recovering
punitive damages).
In DiGiovanni, the New Jersey Supreme Court plainly stated that "[s]omething
more than the mere commission of a tort is always required for punitive damages." 55
N.J. at 190, 260 A.2d at 511 (quoting WiLLAm L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 2, at 9-10 (2d ed. 1955)). "There must be circumstances of aggravation ...
such as... 'malice', or a fraudulent or evil motive on the part of the defendant." Id.
In DiGiovanni, the NewJersey Supreme Court held that an award of punitive damages
was not warranted against a physician who failed to sign an insanity application for
the plaintiff in front of a notary public. See id. at 192, 260 A.2d at 512. The court
explained that this "technical omission" was not an act of "wanton and reckless disregard of the plaintiff's rights." Id. Without such aggravating circumstances, the New
Jersey Supreme Court held that negligence, no matter how gross, was not sufficient to
support an award of punitive damages. Id.; see also Owen, supra note 30, at 384-85
(noting that the effect of vague standards for juries to consider is jury awards of punitive damages on the basis of "passion, bias, and prejudice rather than the law").
156 SeeBMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1594 (1996). Thejury in BMW
found that BMW's conduct was sufficiently egregious to support the $4 million punitive damage award. See id. In the majority opinion written by Justice Stevens, however, the Court expressly refuted that notion. See id. at 1601. In particular, the Court
stressed that BMW did not engage in any acts of affirmative deception and did not act
with a reckless indifference for the safety of consumers. See id.
See also supra note 70 for a discussion of In re the Exxon Valdez, No. A89-0095CV, 1995 WL 527988 (D. Alaska Jan. 27, 1995). Exxon's indifference to the danger-
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1 57

Prior to the enactment of the statute, jury instructions cited
these precedential NewJersey cases, stated that negligence was not
sufficient to support an award of punitive damages, and noted factors for juries to consider in deciding the proper size of a punitive
award. While jury instructions will cite these same standards, they
are now statutory. The only significant difference as a result of the
enactment of the Punitive Damage Act is that now punitive awards,
unbeknownst to the jury, will be automatically limited by the
58
cap. 1
2.

Jury Discretion

Capping punitive damages not only fails to address the problem of vague jury standards, but it creates opportunities for corporations to profit from antisocial behavior. In particular, the cap
strangles the jury's discretion to consider the wealth of the defendant in determining the proper size of the award; it allows defendants to calculate their maximum exposure to punitive liability; and
it eliminates the "legal wild card" incentive for defendants to engage in settlement.
In order to have a deterrent effect, punishment must be substantial enough to give the defendant an incentive to avoid similar
misconduct in the future.'5 9 The New Jersey punitive damage cap
ous nature of captaining an oil vessel through the Prince William Sound is seemingly
reckless misconduct. If Exxon refused to allow Captain Hazelwood to continue his
employment due to his alcoholism, however, they would have been subject to a discrimination suit. It is hard to believe that their conduct amounted to gross negligence and a reckless disregard for the health and safety of others. Obviously Exxon
was strictly liable for the cleanup costs, however, these expenses should have been
covered by a compensatory damage award and should have not entered into a punitive award determination.
157 See McMahon v. Chryssikos, 218 N.J. Super. 571, 579-80, 528 A.2d 104, 109 (Law
Div. 1986). The court concluded that a punitive damage award was not warranted in
a drunk driving situation. See id. In McMahon, the court rejected a "per se" rule
adopted by other states, which states that voluntary intoxication and subsequent operation of a vehicle, per se warrants a punitive damage award. See id. at 578-79, 528 A.2d
at 108-09. The court instead followed NewJersey common-law decisions holding that
in order to establish willful and wanton conduct, the plaintiff must establish that the
defendant had knowledge that injury was the likely or probable result of his conduct
and that the defendant "consciously and intentionally [did] some wrongful act" that resulted in injury. Id. (quoting Staub v. Public Serv. Ry. Co., 97 N.J.L. 297, 300, 117 A.
48, 49-50 (E.& A. 1922)).
158 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.16 (West Supp. 1996). The statute provides that
"[t] he jury shall not be informed of the cap on punitive damages." Id.
159 See Walter Lucas, Punitives Cap Makes Injury a Cost of Doing Business, N.J. L.J., Oct.
24, 1994, at 17, 17 (1994) (recognizing that the "best yardstick" for accomplishing the
deterrent goal of punitive damages is the net worth of the defendant).
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strangles the jury's discretion to consider factors such as the wealth
of the defendant in determining the amount of punitive damages
necessary to deter future misconduct.1 6 ° Punitive damages
awarded to deter corporate misconduct will be affected most
significantly.
Corporations operate within the context of financial statements. As a result, it is important that egregious corporate misconduct results in noteworthy punitive awards affecting corporate
earnings.16 1 Stockholders will feel the effect of such an award, and
those who were responsible for the misconduct will be held accountable. The successor employees will take note of the damage
award and avoid such behavior in the future. When a punitive
award amounts to a slap on the wrist, however, the same employees
are likely to ignore the damage factor in future decisions.

Consequently, unless the jury has the discretion to analyze the
facts of each case, including the wealth of the defendant, punitive
awards that are automatically limited in advance have little effect
punishing and deterring misconduct by a wealthy corporation.62
For example, a company that has assets worth $10 million is more
susceptible to a punitive damage award under the current cap than
a business which has $300 million. The simple fact is, as a result of
the cap, the larger company cannot be punished proportionately
to the smaller company.
Second, because the punitive awards are now restricted to
$350,000 or to a proportionate amount of compensatory damages,
big businesses are able to calculate their maximum exposure for
certain misconduct.1 63 Such a calculation allows them in turn to
160 See id. (arguing that the punitive damage cap minimizes the corporation's overall cost of doing business). Although the statute encourages juries to consider the
financial condition of the defendant as a factor in deciding on the size of the punitive
award, the cap strips such consideration of its importance. See NJ. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:15-5.12 (West Supp. 1996).
161 See Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co., 738 P.2d 1210, 1240 (Kan. 1987). The court
discussed the effect of punitive damage awards on the wealth of the Robins Corporation. See id. According to the court the "investor-perceived value" of the Robins Corporation as of 1985 was approximately $584,798,000. See id. Thus, a large punitive
award was necessary to effectuate significant change. See id. In fact, it took many
punitive damage awards before Robins actually admitted that the Dalkon Shield was
unsafe by recalling the product. See id. at 1243-44; Wencl & Brizzolara, supra note 58,
at 32.
162 See Lucas, supra note 159, at 17, 32. Capping punitive damages limits the ability
of juries to consider the net worth of corporate defendants as a deterrence mechanism. See id. at 804,
163 See Placitella, supra note 63, at 1696. A punitive damage cap creates the fear that
executives, especially those concerned with products liability, will calculate the maximum liability to which the corporation would be subjected in deciding whether to
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conduct cost/benefit analyses, which notably exclude safety and
the interests of the public from the equation. The reality of this
type of decision-making was illustrated by Ford Motor Company,
which decided it more cost effective to litigate damage claims than
16 4
to install a safety device to prevent further injuries.
Third, the punitive damage cap will contribute to the litigation backlog. The cap eliminates incentives for large corporations
to settle suits because the potential for a large punitive damage
award has been severely restricted. 6 ' In particular, where compensatory damages are insignificant, large corporations will no longer
be afraid that ajury will find their conduct egregious
and award a
166
behavior.
future
prevent
to
verdict
substantial
B.

Solutions for Effective Reform

To effectuate significant reform while preserving the jury's
ability to award punitive damages to punish and deter, judges
should enforce the existing checks in the civil justice system. First,
jury instructions must clearly illustrate situations in which the defendant's conduct is sufficiently egregious to warrant a punitive
damage award. 16 7 Second, judges must provide meaningful judicial review of awards at trial and on appeal.'6 6 Third, the New
market a product. See id. Punitive damage caps allow corporations to include potential liability for defective products in their calculation of the cost of doing business.
See Wencl & Brizzolara, supra note 58, at 32.
164 See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 385 (Ct. App. 1981). In
Grimshaw, a jury found that the Pinto's fuel system was located too close to the rear
bumper and lacked essential safety devices. See id. at 360. As a result of these defects,
cars were bursting into flames when involved in minor accidents. See id. During litigation, the plaintiff discovered that Ford had conducted a cost/benefit analysis and
decided that it was not cost effective to make the safety changes. See id. at 385. The
company balanced the $11 cost of installing a rubber mechanism on 11 million cars
versus the expense of paying for actual damages incurred in "180 burn deaths, 180
serious burn injuries, and 2100 burned vehicles." Rustad & Koenig, supra note 3, at
1313. As a result of this indifference for the safety of consumers, the jury awarded the
plaintiff $2,516,000 in compensatory and $125,000,000 in punitive damages. See Grimshaw, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 358. The trial judge conditioned the denial of a new trial on
the plaintiff's acceptance of a remittitur of punitive damages to $3,500,000. See id.
165 See Sales & Coles, supra note 11, at 1156.
166 See Lucas, supra note 159, at 17 (explaining that corporations think about their
potential liability when they contemplate tortious conduct).
167 See Owen, supra note 30, at 385 (explaining the importance of jury instructions
that clearly demonstrate to the jury the purpose for which punitive damages are
awarded and which conduct deserves a punitive damage award).
168 See Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 22 (1990) (stating that
Alabama courts review punitive damage awards to ensure that they are "reasonable in
their amount and rational in light of their purpose to punish what has occurred and
to deter its repetition"); see also Owen, supra note 30, at 385 (suggesting that meaning-
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Jersey Legislature should enact a split recovery statute limiting the
windfall effect of punitive damage awards.169 Finally, in a society in
which corporate profits have reached record levels, the continued
use of the punitive damage doctrine is necessary to ensure that corporate misconduct is effectively punished and deterred.
1. Clear and Specific Jury Instructions
It is generally conceded that the jury system is not perfect. It is
a long-standing American legal tradition, however, that defendants
will be adjudged by a jury of their peers. Over the years, courts
have recognized the potential for abuse ofjury discretion in awarding punitive damages. For that reason, New Jersey common law
and statutory law provide factors forjuries to consider in a punitive
damage analysis. 7 ° These vague factors, however, must be accompanied by sufficient jury instructions to guide juries through their
decision-making process.
Judges should establish jury instructions that explain the nature and purpose of punitive damages and clearly illustrate situations in which these awards are warranted. 171 Judicial instructions
must ensure that mere negligence is not sufficient to warrant a punitive damage award and must require plaintiffs to establish the
defendant's willful and wanton misconduct by clear and convincing evidence. 7 ' To prevent juries from misinterpreting the standard, examples of conduct warranting punitive awards should
supplement the trial judge's warning that according to New Jersey
law, negligence, no matter how gross, does not support an award of
73
punitive damages.1

2. Meaningful Judicial Review
In addition to reform efforts that provide the juries with subful judicial review should include scrutinizing the evidence supporting the award and
written reasons why or why not the award is warranted in light of the twin goals of
punishment and deterrence).
169 See Clay R. Stevens, Comment, Split-Recovery: A ConstitutionalAnswer to the Punitive
DamageDilemma, 21 PEPP. L. REv. 857, 870 (1994) (stating that abstracting a portion of
the punitive damage award eliminates the windfall effect).
170 For a discussion of the NewJersey common law standards for juries to consider
in awarding punitive damages, see supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
171 See Owen, supra note 30, at 385 (stating that 'Juries must be instructed fully and
precisely on the nature of punitive damages, the standards for their availability and
the conditions under which such damages may or may not be applicable to the facts
of the particular case").
172 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.12(a) (West Supp. 1996) (requiring clear and convincing evidence to support a punitive award).
173 See id.
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stantial direction in their punitive damage analysis, trial and appellate judges should scrutinize the facts and circumstances of each
case to ensure that the punitive award was warranted and reason-

able in light of the goals of punishment and deterrence.' 7 4 Reliable evidence demonstrates that when courts exercised meaningful
judicial review, a substantial percentage of large punitive damage
verdicts were remitted.' 7 5 New Jersey's common-law levels of re-

judges to simply rubber stamp jury
view, however, encourage many
176
awards of punitive damages.

The Supreme Court's recent willingness in BMWto give meaning to the term "due process judicial review" has put some teeth
into the judicial review of punitive damage awards.177 Although
the Court's opinion fails to expressly delineate between constitutionally acceptable awards and "grossly excessive" awards, the reversal of the award opens the door for more meaningful judicial
review by lower courts. The three guideposts enunciated by the
1 78
BMWmajority leave a lot to the individual court's interpretation.
174 Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 840 (2d Cir. 1967). Judge
Friendly proffered that the best solution for keeping punitive damage awards under
control was through effective judicial scrutiny of awards. See id.; see also 1 SCHLUETER
& REDDEN, supra note 66, § 4.4(A) (5) (d) (3), at 124 (arguing that courts should have
discretion to consider all the facts and circumstances to determine whether the size of
a punitive award will accomplish the goals of punishment and deterrence).
175 See Fisk, supranote 51, at C2 (recognizing that large punitive damage awards are
very susceptible to reduction or post-trial set aside); see also Gottlieb, supranote 51, at
1 (stating that of the punitive verdicts of $1 million or more, 80.9% were reduced in
post-trial proceedings or by settlement).
176 See Fritsche v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 55 N.J. 322, 330, 261 A.2d 657, 661
(1970) (quoting the level of review, "this court has held that verdicts should be upset
for being excessive only in clear cases"); see also Taweel v. Starn's Shoprite Supermarket, 58 N.J. 227, 236, 276 A.2d 861, 865 (1971) (stating that trial judges "should not
interfere with the quantum of damages assessed by ajury unless it is so disproportionate to the injuries and resulting disabilities shown as to shock [their] conscience and
to convince [them] that to sustain the award would be manifestly unjust"); Hager v.
Weber, 7 N.J. 201, 213, 81 A.2d 155, 160-61 (1951) (noting that damage awards will
not be set aside unless so excessive as "to give rise to the inference of mistake, passion,
prejudice, or partiality").
When courts apply this deferential level of review, the jury award, which resulted
from the jury's independent consideration of the facts, is likely to be affirmed. See In
re the Exxon Valdez, No. A89-0095-CV, 1995 WL 527988, at *11 (D. Alaska Jan. 27,
1995). Reviewing the $5 billion punitive damage award against Exxon, the district
court held that according to the Hammond factors raised by the courts in TXO and
Haslip, the jury verdict was not excessive. See id. The court noted that the "jury made
a 'qualitative assessment based on a host of facts and circumstances unique to the
particular case before it."' Id. (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.,
509 U.S. 443, 457 (1993)).
177 See supra notes 119-48 and accompanying text.
178 For a discussion of the three guideposts followed by Justice Stevens in BMW, see
supra notes 133-41 and accompanying text.
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The non-repetitive nature of civil misconduct that warrants a punitive award, however, necessarily requires that juries and judges
alike have some discretion to analyze the facts and circumstances
179
of each individual case.
To further encourage meaningful judicial review, the New
Jersey Punitive Damage Act should have overruled the commonlaw deferential level of review and allowed reviewing judges to scrutinize the facts and circumstances underlying a punitive damage
award."' Additionally, to ensure that the review is meaningful,
judges should be required to provide a written explanation of their
reasons for affirming or striking down a punitive damage award. 18 1
Unlike a punitive damage cap, meaningful judicial review of punitive damage awards would check jury discretion without automatically limiting the liability of defendants.
3.

Split Recovery Statutes

Proponents of civil justice reform cite windfall judgments as a
significant reason for the alleged frivolous litigation explosion,
claiming that plaintiffs and plaintiffs' attorneys exploit the judicial
system seeking to recover million dollar punitive damage awards.1 2
If state legislatures were to enact a statute awarding a portion of
the punitive damage award to a state agency or trust fund for all
potential plaintiffs, incentives to bring frivolous litigation, multiple
punitive damage awards, and windfall recoveries would be severely
limited."8 ' Accordingly, a number of states have already enacted
179

See Owen, supra note 30, at 385. The standards for awarding punitive damages

are necessarily vague because the juries need flexibility to analyze the facts and circumstances of each case. See id. The appropriate methods to check the vague standards are clear and particularized jury instructions, meaningful judicial review of the

evidence justifying the punitive award, and a detailed written account of the judge's
reasons for affirming or reducing the award. See id.
180 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.14(a) (West Supp. 1996). The statute provides:
"the trial judge shall ascertain that the award is reasonable in its amount and justified

in the circumstances of the case, in light of the purpose to punish the defendant and
deter that defendant from repeating such conduct." Id.
181 See Owen, supra note 30, at 385 (stating that judges should provide "written reasons ...explicitly particularizing the reasons why the award was or was not deserved
in light of the legal standards, the doctrine's goals and the facts of the particular
case").
182 See Stevens, supra note 169, at 870 (asserting that windfall awards lead to "riskseeking behavior" and the encouragement of "excessive and unnecessary litigation").
183 See id. Split recovery statutes limit the incentive to bring frivolous litigation. See
id. Allocating a portion of the punitive damage award to a state fund alleviates the
windfall effect of punitive damages and creates a disincentive for the maintenance of
unnecessary litigation. See id. at 869.
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A split recovery statute was proposed in New Jersey, but did
not receive the support from lobby groups to pressure state legislators to move on the bill." 5 The reason for this lack of support is
that the statute does not champion the plaintiffs lobby position or
the big business' lobby goals.' 8 6 A split recovery statute does not

limit the liability of corporate defendants for punitive damages,
and it limits the potential recovery for plaintiffs. 8 7 A split recovery
statute would effectively reform punitive damages without limiting
the jury's ability to effectively punish and deter misconduct.
4.

The Future

The twin aims of punishment and deterrence have preserved
the doctrine of punitive damages from erosion for many years.
The twin aims, however, could not withstand the onslaught of tort
reform and a punitive damage cap in NewJersey. As a result of this
statutory enactment which automatically limits the discretion of
the jury, the effectiveness of the doctrine is in jeopardy. In the
past, the threat of punitive damage awards forced corporate executives to keep the interests of the public in mind.' 8 Today, corporate wealth is at record levels and stock prices that reflect corporate
earnings continue to set new records.' 8 9 To continue effective
punishment and deterrence of corporate misconduct, punitive
184 See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1207 (West 1996) (allowing distribution of punitive
damage award among "plaintiff, plaintiff's attorney and Illinois Department of Rehabilitative Services"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(2) (West 1992) (appropriating 35% of
punitive damage awards to the Florida General Revenue Fund or the Florida Public
Medical Assistance Trust Fund); Gordon v. State, 585 So. 2d 1033, 1035-38 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1991), affd, 608 So. 2d 800, 809 (Fla. 1992) (upholding the constitutionality
of Florida's split recovery statute). But see McBride v. General Motors Corp., 737 F.
Supp. 1563, 1578 (M.D. Ga. 1990) (holding a Georgia split recovery statute unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause).
185 In NewJersey, S.291, 206th Leg., 1st Sess. (1994) remains dormant before the
Senate Commerce Committee and A. 148, 206th Leg., 1st Sess. (1994) remains inactive before the AssemblyJudiciary Committee. The NewJersey legislation would allocate 75% of punitive damage award to the NewJersey Health Care Trust Fund. See S.
291, 206th Leg., 1st Sess. § 1(c) (1994); A. 148, 206th Leg., 1st Sess. § 1(c) (1994).
186 See Stevens, supra note 169, at 863-64 (claiming that split recovery statutes take
away plaintiffs' incentive to litigate where they have sustained little damages but the
defendants' conduct was especially egregious).
187 See Lynda A. Sloane, Note, The Split Award Statute: A Move Toward Effectuating the
True Purpose of Punitive Damages, 28 VAL.U. L. REv. 473, 478 (1993) (noting that split
recovery awards "disgorge" plaintiffs of any potential windfall).
188 See Lucas, supra note 159, at 17 (reiterating that punitive damages effectively
deter corporate misconduct and keep these powerful influences in check).
189 Suzanne McGee, Dow Breaks 6000, but for How Long, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 1996,
at CI (stating that the "Dow was rocketing to new millennial highs").
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damage awards must coincide with the increased profits of corporations. The New Jersey punitive damage cap, although aimed at
reforming punitive damages, prevents the doctrine from evolving
and thereby addressing the wealthier modem business environment's increasing indifference to the safety of citizens.
David C. Berry

